Oracle charges 'corporate theft,' slaps SAP with lawsuitTodd R. Weiss March 22, 2007 (Computerworld) Painting a picture of what it calls "corporate theft on a grand scale," enterprise software vendor Oracle Corp. today sued German software rival SAP AG, alleging that SAP "has stolen thousands of proprietary, copyrighted software products and other confidential materials that Oracle developed to service its own support customers." In a 44-page lawsuit (download PDF) filed today in U.S. District Court in the Northern District of California, Oracle alleges that SAP "has copied and swept thousands of Oracle software products and other proprietary and confidential materials onto its own servers" as part of a plan to compile "an illegal library of Oracle's copyrighted software code and other materials." "This storehouse of stolen Oracle intellectual property enables SAP to offer cut rate support services to customers who use Oracle software, and to attempt to lure them to SAP's applications software platform and away from Oracle's," the lawsuit alleges. Oracle said it filed the suit to "stop SAP's illegal intrusions and theft, to prevent SAP from using the materials it has illegally acquired to compete with Oracle and to recover damages and attorneys' fees." A spokesman for SAP Americas declined to comment on the suit. "We have just been notified of the lawsuit, and have taken note of the Oracle press release. We are still reviewing the matter, and, until we have a chance to study the allegations, SAP will follow its standard policy of not commenting on pending litigation," said Bill Wohl. The amount of damages being sought by Oracle was not revealed in the lawsuit. The suit cites 11 claims, including allegations that SAP violated the Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and the California Computer Data Access and Fraud Act; engaged in unfair competition; engaged in intentional and negligent interference with prospective economic advantage; and civil conspiracy. The lawsuit also alleges that "SAP is engaged in systematic, illegal access to -- and taking from -- Oracle's computerized customer support systems. ... SAP gained repeated and unauthorized access, in many cases by use of pretextual customer log-in credentials, to Oracle's proprietary, password-protected customer support Web site." The alleged incidents were discovered in late November 2006, according to the lawsuit. The case may reflect a recent trend, as third-party support services firms try to lure IT managers away from getting their support from the original software vendor toward lower-cost options from other providers. The lawsuit alleges that "the access and download activity Oracle observed on its systems in late November and December 2006 did not resemble the authorized, limited access to which its customers were entitled. Instead, SAP employees using the log-in credentials of Oracle customers with expired or soon-to-expire support rights had, in a matter of a few days or less, accessed and copied thousands of individual software and support materials." In one case, using one customer's credentials, "SAP suddenly downloaded an average of over 1,800 items per day for four days straight (compared to that customer's normal downloads averaging 20 per month)," according to the suit. "Other purported customers hit the Oracle site and harvested software and support materials after they had canceled all support with Oracle in favor of SAP's TN division. "Oracle has found many examples of similar activity," the lawsuit said -- including more than 10,000 unauthorized downloads of material relating to hundreds of different programs. The downloads originated from an Internet Protocol (IP) address in Bryan, Texas, which is the location of an SAP America branch office and home to its wholly owned subsidiary SAP TN. SAP TN, according to the lawsuit, provides technical support services for versions of Oracle's PeopleSoft and JD Edwards applications. The lawsuit goes on to allege that SAP's motivation for its activities began after Oracle's January 2005 acquisition of PeopleSoft. "SAP AG had no answer for the business proposition the new Oracle offered," the suit alleged. "Not only do many SAP AG customers use Oracle's superior database software programs, but now Oracle offered a deeper, broader product line of enterprise applications software programs to compete against SAP AG." "Rather than improve its own products and offerings, SAP AG instead considered how to undermine Oracle," the suit states. "One way was to hit at Oracle's customer base -- and potentially increase its own -- by acquiring and bankrolling a company that claimed the ability to compete with Oracle support and maintenance services on Oracle's own software products." An Oracle spokeswoman also declined to comment on the lawsuit. Charles King, principal analyst with Pund-IT Inc. in Hayward, Calif., called the lawsuit "a curious state of affairs. Oracle has been trying very hard to remake itself as a company that looks more like SAP than as the classic Oracle," King said. SAP provides a wide range of end-to-end business software applications, which is what Oracle has been trying to do through its acquisitions over the last several years, he said. "For SAP, the database is one part ... but simply one part of the technical underpinnings" needed by users. "Oracle started on the database side, and as time has gone on, the company has recognized that being a database specialist [alone] was not a way to sustain growth." Oracle reacted by adding other application lines and becoming more like SAP, King said. "I think they've become very successful at pursuing that strategy." Mervyn Adrian, an analyst with Cambridge, Mass.-based Forrester Research Inc., said that until the case is dissected, it's important not to assume that any of the alleged actions were done by SAP as corporate policy. Instead, any activity could have been the work of individual employees. "One always has to be careful to separate the acts of individuals from corporate acts," Adrian said. "It's hard for me to believe that a company would build such a program to do such a thing. It seems less than credible." It is, however, "pretty routine for people [and companies] to look at each other's [Web] sites and grab whatever they can," he said. In cases such as those alleged in the Oracle lawsuit, that "usually represents misguided behavior on the part of individuals," he said. "This may turn out to be a tempest in a teapot," with someone ultimately being found to have done something wrong and then being disciplined, Adrian said. "I frankly doubt that [SAP is] driving its strategy based on pirated information on what their competition is doing. I don't think what they find in a Dumpster at Oracle changes their strategy on any basis." Computerworld's Marc L. Songini contributed to this report.
Ten dangerous claims about smart phone security (Computerworld) My heart sank when I first saw Al Gore pull out his BlackBerry. It was in the waning weeks of the 2000 presidential campaign, and there he was on the TV, tapping away on his then-novel converged device. Though I had no evidence, I was positive that whatever he was reading had already been perused by some conservative skunk works, with his responses scrutinized not long after. Given recent revelations about the opposition's ethics and panting obsession with domestic spying, I still suspect that any eavesdropping technically possible at the time was probably being done. So imagine my dismay when I saw Sen. Barack Obama pulling a BlackBerry from his coat pocket shortly after announcing his candidacy for president. Like many others addicted to their converged devices (Sen. John McCain was apparently indulging during the last State of the Union speech, not sleeping), he's become a constant user, and he now uses it to manage a large portion of his communications. While I hope these politicians have IT staffers paying attention to this sort of thing, more often than not, a series of underinformed security and privacy assumptions are made shortly before sensitive information starts flowing. Many common assumptions about the security and privacy of smart phones or other handheld converged devices are off-base or just flat-out wrong. For any high-value target -- whether that's a political candidate or an organization with valuable financial or personal data -- a little more thought ought to go into the process of selecting and deploying any device handling important data. It makes sense then to challenge the more widespread assumptions and consider how to handle oft-ignored risks. 1. It's just a phone with cool features, right? No, it's not. There's been a major shift in smart phone architecture in the past few years. Yesterday's phone ran an embedded operating system with software hooks written for the specific model's CPU, interface, vocoder and radio. Today's mobile converged device is more likely to run software considerably more advanced and versatile than desktop systems just 10 years ago. That versatility is an enemy of security because it turns the underlying security architecture on its head. It used to be that a phone or small handheld device had a default-deny security model, because every feature was added from the ground up. There were no extraneous services running on the device, because every one was purpose-built. Now most converged devices run commodity operating systems, such as Symbian OS (owned in part by Nokia and Sony Ericsson) or Microsoft's Windows CE/Mobile family, that have portability as a core design goal. This means there are plenty of communications services and data handling hooks in the code base, and it's up to phone and application developers to ensure unused code is removed or disabled where not appropriate. No one wants to annoy customers, so more often than not, a wide range of services and interfaces is included and enabled -- equivalent to a default-allow stance. While I'm a fan of open systems, it's worth evaluating a mobile device that provides the features you want and no more in the base configuration -- perhaps a "feature phone" instead of a smart phone -- and place less priority on the capacity for upgrades and expansion. 2. It's stable, just like any other purpose-built appliance. Don't assume that the lack of operating system patches and application updates for a smart phone means that they aren't needed. In the short history of mobile malware, Symbian received bad press by playing host to the first, the Cabir worm. However, Windows CE wasn't far behind with the Duts virus and Brador Trojan. Even single-purpose network devices are periodically found vulnerable to network and service exploits, and vendors ought to make updates available in a timely manner. The bad news is that mobile platform vendors are still very slow to issue operating system and application patches. The only practical way to mitigate this is through a mix of process and technology: Teach users proper skepticism of e-mailed attachments and unexpected connection or update confirmations, and implement anti-malware programs for those who just keep clicking "OK." 3. Communications are encrypted from end to end. BlackBerry and Sidekick users may have heard that their communications are encrypted "end to end," but e-mail and other communications are encrypted only from the phone to the phone company or service provider's servers. Beyond that point, e-mail, instant messages and file transfers may be transmitted unencrypted over the public Internet by default. This is less of a concern for closed organizations where everyone involved uses the same services, but vendors, partners, consultants and others outside the organization often use their own e-mail addresses and smart phones on other carriers. There's no guarantee of message encryption in these cases, and the risk is no better or worse than any other Internet e-mail. 4. The connection's secure unless I use Wi-Fi in a cafe. Some might be concerned about the cellular connection itself. The GPRS and EDGE data protocols used by T-Mobile and Cingular are based on GSM, and GSM authentication algorithms such as A5 have been broken in ways that allow a motivated eavesdropper to reconstruct voice and data conversations with only a few thousand dollars of equipment. CDMA and associated algorithms are mildly more secure (PDF format), but many carriers choose not to implement all of the security controls available because of performance and handset compatibility. Use a VPN to mitigate this problem for sensitive data and make sure essential services are encrypted at the application level using SSL or similar protocols. While it might seem redundant, using a voice-over-IP client through a smart phone's VPN data connection is one way to ensure that voice calls are private. Direct SIP-compliant VoIP clients are best for this; closed-protocol applications such as Skype Mobile may try to route across a public connection even if a VPN is available. It also may relay connections between NAT endpoints through random clients on the Internet, so it's not a good candidate in this scenario. It's also worth noting that VoIP with AEC, one of the features of Windows Mobile 5, is not encryption. AEC refers to Acoustic Echo Canceling, not the NIST Advanced Encryption Standard ("AES ") described in FIPS 197. 5. E-mails and messages are secure from prying eyes. Whoever controls your smart phone application server has access to your data. While smart phone service providers and software packages all provide a modicum of access control, administrators with root access can always get at your information if they want. While your corporate IT department might not be spying on marketing on behalf of finance, Obama might want to take note that congressional IT organizations that serve both Democratic and Republican senators have had several incidents involving e-mail disclosures to other parties. In the midst of the Mark Foley scandal, it was interesting to note a person described in the media as a "Democratic operative" was able to retrieve and forward messages sent months earlier from a Republican representative's smart phone. Know where messages and other data reside when sent from a smart phone. If service is provided by a neutral vendor, make sure you have a service-level agreement that considers whether your data may be commingled with other businesses -- possibly your competitors -- on the same systems. Those with specific competitive concerns ought to run their own systems using their own administrative staff. Obama would do well to use a device controlled by the Democratic National Committee or his own campaign, rather than one managed by Senate IT staff and easily influenced pages. 6. Using a mobile phone constitutes out-of-band communication. A phone call over a landline used to be an acceptable method for communicating out-of-band administrative information. For example, a system administrator might call you back at your desk to verbally give you a new password (which you then changed, right?). This worked because the desk phone was isolated from the network and system resources to which you were being given access. Not so anymore. If you lose your smart phone and IT calls you back on that mobile number to confirm the trouble ticket, is it a meaningful method of verifying the identity or location of the person who answers? Of course not. Possession of the number means little if anything anymore, especially since most phones will allow answering of an incoming call even when locked. IT help desks should cross callbacks off the list of acceptable methods of identity verification for anything to do with mobile devices or remote access. The new BlackBerry Smart Card Reader is a viable option for those who need to authenticate using something they possess, and while similar options lag a little on other platforms, they are available. 7. I trust the integrity of data and applications on a smart phone. On modern desktop and server systems, file systems with journaling, database-like features and integrated backup are common. Not so with mobile devices, where almost all data integrity relies upon some sort of synchronization with a stable fixed server system for backup and management. Windows Mobile users can use a variety of synchronization options to ensure that messages and data on the mobile device are consistent with a central Microsoft-based repository such as Exchange, SharePoint or even Groove file-share workspaces. BlackBerry Enterprise users have over-the-air device security options that include data synchronization and backup, and remote shutdown options for lost devices. (A product called SyncBerry provides advanced sync and backup features to SyncML-capable systems, and extends some of the BlackBerry goodness to Symbian users.) T-Mobile's Sidekick, on the other hand, stores very little data locally because it's constantly synchronizing with the servers at Danger Inc., the manufacturer. If the device is lost, damaged or reset, data can be reloaded on the device by logging in with a name and password. However, this means that data is stored at a service provider with which individuals have a rather one-sided service-level agreement unsuitable for corporate use. All of this can be protected by setting the device to require a passcode at start-up. If the wrong passcode is entered four times on Sidekick, local data is erased but can be restored by a remote password reset on the management Web site. Security administrators might lament the scarcity of people who use this feature, but it's interesting to note that the young thief who acquired up the now-famous Sidekick II in New York last year was identified and arrested only because she had access to the phone, sent messages and took pictures of herself -- which then synchronized with the legitimate owner's account on the Danger servers. What about application integrity? OK, you say, you'll just install digitally signed or approved applications. A few months ago, some enterprising pot-stirrers managed to buy a BlackBerry code-signing key from RIM (arguably the most security-oriented of the smart phone vendors) for $100, no questions asked. This is all bad. Users tricked into giving network access to unsigned applications may be opening themselves up to all sorts of spyware, message relay and other malware, but signed applications don't even require consent to suspicious prompts. It's far better to teach astute users about acceptable applications and forbid the rest from installing anything. The choice of installable applications ought to be from a whitelist -- or no list. 8. Information deleted from a smart phone is gone, right? Most converged devices have relatively small storage capacities, and use variants of the venerable FAT file system. When a file is deleted, the markers for the beginning and end of the data on the storage media are removed so that it is no longer retrievable by normal means (orphaned). However, the actual data remains until it's overwritten. There are no guarantees against orphaned data. In fact, the whole practice of cell phone forensics rests on the availability of orphaned data and logs. I'm not aware of any smart phone that comes with a secure delete function to remove orphaned file system data. Perhaps, Apple will include the file system wiping option from OS X in its forthcoming iPhone, but it's not present in any of the other major players' offerings. With many smart phones offering basic word processing and spreadsheet applications, residual data from deleted copies becomes even more of an issue. IT staffers responsible for disposal of outdated smart phones should use tools to ensure that residual data is removed. The simple method is to copy and erase chunks of data onto the device in a manner that fills the flash memory or hard disk, but forensically sound methods are available from various vendors. If the device memory can't be erased, it should be destroyed -- a damaged but repairable smart phone ought not be found in the trash. Those resorting to a hammer are advised to remove the Li-Ion battery first. 9. Spying on my smart phone is hard. Think spying on your activities is hard? Think again. Most smart phones have no equivalent of Bluetooth authentication when plugged in; they just become slave USB devices and give up all your data. Worse yet, a rogue employee, jealous husband or political opponent can buy backdoor malware ... uh, "remote phone monitoring" software here and keep ongoing tabs on communications. If they manage to install the spendy version on your phone (or trick you into doing it), it even includes remote microphone activation and generates a tidy Excel spreadsheet of your activities each day. Flexispy is cheap, oriented toward consumers and very worrisome. It's only available for Symbian so far, but less-polished remote viewing software or illicit copies of management tools are available for BlackBerry, Windows Mobile and other platforms. It's not clear if anti-malware products send alerts upon finding these, so the best policy now is to educate users on physical security and admonish them not to install unexpected software or updates. 10. Abuse is minimal because the network and phones are constrained. Four words: Remember ASCII art porn. Network miscreants will work with what's available, and resource limitations only make those inclined to misbehave do so in more creative ways. The difference is that smart phones are quite capable, and modern 2.5G and 3G phone networks provide surprisingly adequate bandwidth. For example, there are now multiple BitTorrent clients for Symbian as well as other platforms, some phones are adept at seamlessly switching between cellular and unsecured Wi-Fi networks, and with the price point for 4+ GB flash cards dropping below $100, there's lots to worry about. To paraphrase Steve Jobs, misuse of technology is a social problem, not a technological one. Having a well-defined policy for the use of converged devices is essential prior to deployment. Conversely, rolling out smart phones without proper guidance will lead to all sorts of havoc. Users might respect pay-per-minute airtime as a corporate asset, but unless instructed otherwise they'll think of flat-rate data services as free connectivity on someone else's network (not covered by your policy), and the phone itself as corporate tribal adornment suitable for display anywhere, anytime. More to consider Am I advocating Naomi Campbell's method of disposing of one's fancy mobile? No, in fact, just this month I bought a new smart phone. While I'm no fan of troublesome devices -- two colleagues recently commented that their new WM5 phones rarely crash more than once per day now -- mobile e-mail and Internet access are quickly becoming de rigueur. I made a list of the functions I needed and tried to avoid models that included features I would not use or could not secure. Readers looking for a structured set of criteria for evaluating and selecting a specific smart phone product are encouraged to read NIST Special Publication 800-48 (PDF format). It's a little dated, but when mobile system and application developers are rediscovering every mistake they made a decade ago with remote desktop and laptop systems, these old documents are right on the mark. Jon Espenschied has been at play in the security industry for enough years to become enthusiastic, blasé, cynical, jaded, content and enthusiastic again. He is currently a senior security consultant in Seattle, where his advice has been ignored by CEOs, auditors and sysadmins alike. This column has been edited to correct a misstatement: The Symbian OS is in fact owned in part by Nokia and Sony Ericsson.
Oil revenue data gets baked in Alaska Marc L. Songini March 21, 2007 () The Alaska Department of Revenue blamed human error for last summer's temporary loss of 800,000 paper document images related to the state's Permanent Fund Dividend (PFD), which makes annual payments to all Alaskan residents from funds generated from the lease of oil fields in the state. The error occurred last June, when a network specialist trying to work out a storage glitch inadvertently lost most of the PFD documents stored by the agency, including the 800,000 images. In a statement released today, Norm Snyder, the agency's IT manager, said that the agency has since increased the storage capacity on its arrays from 3TB to 7TB, "making it much easier to restore databases and perform regular tests." The agency also created "a formal written backup plan, where active file groups and logs are backed up daily, and full backups, which include all file groups, are performed quarterly," he said. Snyder said the data was lost while a network specialist was attempting to fix a malfunctioning EMC Corp. storage array. The fix required cleaning out a section of corrupted data, which apparently caused the loss of some key SQL Server backup data and files, Snyder said. When the error was discovered, the network specialist tried to access the backup data from tape storage, but found that it "had inadvertently not been selected to be written to tape during the normal backup process." Without it, the database couldn't be brought back up online, Snyder noted. Working through the next weekend, agency IT staffers were able to restore much of the information lost using an old backup file. Snyder estimated that about 800,000 documents scanned during 2006 were not backed up. The lack of backed-up data was caused "strictly [by] human error and the consequences of not placing a check box next to the [primary database] file, instructing the tape backup software to place the file onto tape," said Snyder. The paper versions of those documents were rescanned over a two-month period by four part-time employees assigned to the task, Snyder said. The rescanning process cost the state about $200,000, he said. To avoid future errors, the agency has added additional storage capacity and created a formal written back up plan, Snyder said. The agency will also establish an offsite file replication system in Anchorage. Agency officials declined further comment.
GratisCard offers a credit card for the anonymous Jaikumar Vijayan March 21, 2007 (Computerworld) Concerned that losing your credit or debit card could result in fraudulent card use and the potential loss of personal data? GratisCard Inc. thinks so, too. That's why, when the company launches on April 1, it plans to introduce the nation's first completely anonymous credit card with no name or number and no physical data stored on the card itself. It will also be the first credit card in the U.S. to support authentication based on personal identification numbers (PIN) for all credit transactions. Such authentication is already widely supported in Europe via so-called Chip and PIN technology and is supposed to be far more secure than signature-based transactions. GratisCard is a new payment card company being launched by AOL LLC founder Steve Case and his investment company, Revolution Inc. It is targeted largely at merchants that process low-value payments, such as fast food restaurants, sports clubs and game arenas, said Avivah Litan, an analyst at Stamford, Conn.-based Gartner Inc. As such, it does not necessarily compete with big-brand cards such as Visa U.S.A. Inc. and MasterCard International Inc., she said. The card is being aimed at people with medium to poor credit and offers security that, in concept at least, is similar to what Gartner has been advocating, Litan said. It is designed to plug into the existing payment-card infrastructure without requiring major upgrades. "The GratisCard uses simple technology to make the cards anonymous and render the card data useless even if it is stolen," she said. "It is a living proof of concept that Visa and MasterCard could do the same thing if their member banks were willing to spend some money upgrading their card technology for the sake of tighter security." So far, though, the major card brands have found that it is easier to pass on fraud and breach costs to retailers rather than revamp the entire payment card system, she said. "The big brands have hundreds of millions of cards in circulation, and thousands of processors set up to process payments using the old scheme," she said. Therefore, it is easier for a new player such as GratisCard to introduce "more evolved and intelligent" technology for securing payment transactions, she said. What's likely to make the card appealing for merchants is the fact that GratisCard will charge substantially lower interchange fees than the big brands, she said. Card companies such as MasterCard and Visa charge merchants an average of about 2% in fees for each card transaction. The fees vary by merchant and by transaction. Such fees netted MasterCard and Visa an estimated $30.7 billion in 2005 and an estimated $40 billion in 2006, according to the National Retail Federation. Merchants have for some time now been bridling at the fees and have sought legislative help in keeping the rates down. By combining low interchange rates with better security, "Steve Case certainly is hitting all the sweet spots when it comes to making a new payment card a success," Litan said. But it's unlikely that GratisCard will be much more than a niche player nibbling away at cash and check payments in much the same way as PayPal Inc. has done, she said. "Visa, MasterCard and other brand cardholders are simply too fond of their loyalty programs to give them up that quickly," she said. A spokesman for Revolution declined to comment for this story.
Stolen TJX data used in Florida crime spree Matt Hines March 21, 2007 (InfoWorld) Law enforcement officials in Florida have arrested six individuals suspected of carrying out a fraud scheme built around the misuse of credit card data stolen from retailer TJX Cos. In partnership with the Gainesville Police Department, officials from the Florida Department of Law Enforcement said they have taken six of 10 suspects into custody for allegedly using the TJX customer data to purchase large quantities of gift cards from discount chains Wal-Mart and Sam's Club. The series of arrests marks the first specific instance of crime to be connected to the TJX data heist, although some banks previously reported that consumer accounts affected by the incident had been used in attempted fraud around the globe. Florida Department of Law Enforcement officials confirmed that they initially reported the crime ring to Framingham, Mass.-based TJX in November 2006. The retail chain began informing its customers about the data breach -- blamed on a computer systems intrusion -- in mid-January. TJX media representatives didn't immediately return calls seeking comment on the arrests. The suspects were reported by Florida law enforcement officials to have been traveling throughout the state buying large quantities of Wal-Mart gift cards with the stolen credit card accounts, and then redeeming the cards at other locations. Among the items purchased by the scammers were computers, gaming devices and big-screen TVs. Losses experienced by Wal-Mart and the banks issuing the credit cards total more than $8 million and are still being calculated, according to Florida officials. The suspects arrested were charged with "organized scheme to defraud," a first-degree felony, and had their bonds set at $1 million each. Arrested and booked in Metro-Dade County for the crime spree were Irving Escobar, 18; Reinier Camaraza Alvarez, 27; Julio Oscar Alberti, 33; Dianelly Hernandez, 19; Nair Zuleima Alvarez, 40; and Zenia Mercedes Llorente, 23. The Florida Department of Law Enforcement said that it has also issued warrants for four other people believed to be involved in the scheme. The timeline established by the Florida arrests could help to shed light on the factors that pushed TJX -- which operates several North American and European retail chains, including T.J. Maxx, Marshalls, HomeGoods and A.J. Wright -- to inform the public of its data breach. On Jan. 17, TJX first reported that a computer systems intrusion may have compromised the personal data of an undetermined number of its customers, with hackers obtaining individuals' credit card, debit card and check information, along with data related to merchandise return transactions. While the company has refused to reveal how many customers may be affected by the incident, TJX officials have confirmed that a majority of the data involved belonged to people who shopped at its stores in the U.S., Canada and Puerto Rico during 2003, and between May and December 2006. On Feb. 21, TJX announced that it had discovered a new set of IT systems intrusions that exposed the personally identifiable information of its customers. Company officials said that in addition to the IT systems break-ins it detailed in January, it now believes that intruders also infiltrated its databases repeatedly during 2005. Reports of crime connected to the TJX data theft first surfaced on Jan. 24, when the Massachusetts Bankers Association reported that several banks in the state had observed instances of fraud specifically related to the accounts of consumers involved in the TJX incident. The industry group said at the time that it had received reports of criminal activity carried out via debit and credit card accounts exposed in the heist in Florida, Georgia and Louisiana in the U.S., as well as in Hong Kong and Sweden overseas. When TJX first reported the incident in January, company officials said they had become aware of the data theft in late 2006 but waited to begin informing customers of the breach in deference to ongoing law enforcement investigations, including those being carried out by the U.S. Department of Justice and U.S. Secret Service. The Massachusetts Bankers Association, among others, publicly criticized the company for not moving to disclose the incident sooner. Over the past two years, more than 30 U.S. states have adopted new laws that establish more rigid guidelines for the reporting of consumer data exposure. A bill under consideration in Massachusetts would require organizations to inform consumers within five business days after a breach affecting their data was detected.
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